

Interference Situations in Gamma Spectrometry

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*2nd Advanced Training Course on Illicit Trafficking
and Radiological Consequences with NUCLEONICA*

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<http://www.nucleonica.net/>
<http://itu.jrc.ec.europa.eu/>




ITRAC-2: JRC-ITU, Karlsruhe, 4-6th November 2009

Prevention of nuclear smuggling (Illicit Trafficking)
Nuclide Identification of highest importance

Gamma Spectrometry using
an RID (Radionuclide Identification Device)

Nuclide Identification more difficult, when:
source shielded
spectra of two or more sources interfere
= **Masking**



Interaction of gamma rays with matter in the detector volume

transfer of photon energy to electron energy

A. **photoelectric absorption** -> photopeak

gamma photon disappears in absorber atom

photoelectron emitted

+ characteristic x-ray or auger electron

B. **Compton scattering** -> continuum

gamma photon scattered – some energy given to an electron, depending on angle



all angles up to max. 180° (Compton edge)

scattered photon escapes detection

C. **pair production**

gamma energy $\gg 2m_0c^2$

production of positron + electron





selected effects that complicate the detector response function

peak-like distortions from the detector surroundings:

1. characteristic x-rays





2. backscattering






three regions of possible interferences -> three types of Masking

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






Ba 133 + Pu 239

1mm lead

interferences at
adjacent lines




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



Compton scattering within detector volume
at different angles → continuum

comparison of different detector volumes shows
different peak – continuum ratio due to escaping particles




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higher initial photon energy -> lower efficiency in full energy peak


more scattering events and escapes possible -> increased continuum in relation to peak

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
K 40 + U 238

5 mm lead



if statistical fluctuation high compared to peak height of second nuclide, peaks could disappear in continuum

Compton scattering in the detector surroundings



gamma photon Compton scattered in surrounding material


some energy deposited in electron there

gamma photon with reduced energy scattered back into detector volume

new energy usually ~ 200 keV

for angles greater than 120° independent on original energy

-> backscatter peak




$$E' = E / (1 + E/m_0c^2 (1 - \cos \beta))$$

E'_{back} for backscattering

$$\beta = 180^\circ$$

$$m_0c^2 = 511 \text{ keV}$$

$$E'_{\text{back}} = E / (1 + 2E/511)$$




$$E'_{\text{back_cesium}} = 184 \text{ keV}$$

$$E'_{\text{back_cobalt}} = 210, 214 \text{ keV}$$

for great primary energies:

$$E'_{\text{back_max}} \sim 511/2$$


peak always at 255 keV or less



Cs 137 + U 235


No backscattering
contribution

U 235 peak at 185,7
keV clearly visible



with
backscatter peak

U 235 peak hidden



with high backscattering interference also in HPGe spectrum


countermeasures:

- high resolution detectors (expensive)

- full spectrum analysis
or template matching

- for neutron emitters:
additional neutron detection

- to detect shielding
or inhomogeneities:
x-ray machines



further recommended reading:

G. Knoll, *Radiation Detection and Measurement*

M.I. Reinhard et al., *Detection of Illicit Nuclear Materials
Masked with other Gamma-Ray Emitters*

R.M. Keyser and T.R. Twomey, *Detector resolution required for accurate identification
in common gamma-ray masking situations*

IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 6, *Combating Illicit Trafficking
in Nuclear and other Radioactive Material*